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In just over 10 years Egypt stopped having to import
cement and became a major cement exporter. Privatization
played a leading role in this transformation.
In common with many developing countries in the late
20th century, the Egyptian state had, until recently, major-
ity stakes in most major industrial companies. That situa-
tion is changing as the government attempts to modernize
the economy through a range of measures that include
privatizing state-owned companies. The goal of privatiza-
tion is to increase economic growth, but the transition
from a state-run to a free-market economy has not been
without its problems. The recent history of Egypt’s cement
industry is a case in point.
The industry got its start 80 years ago with the creation of
Torah Cement, a joint venture between Swiss and Egyptian
capital, explains Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, associate profes-
sor of economics at Cairo































Privatization Alone Is Not Enough
The sale of Egyptian state interests in cement was only the beginning in a
long process to establish an efficient and competitive industry.
The privatization of state-owned companies attracted new players to Egypt’s
cement industry and generated export growth. But at the time, the market wasn’t
regulated to ensure fair play among businesses. New legislation is now helping to
rid it of anticompetitive behaviour.
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THE POWER OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS
Competition
and Development
In the 1960s, the Government of Egypt began nationaliz-
ing the industry. By the early 1990s, the entire sector com-
prising more than a dozen companies was state owned.
And by 1993 Egypt was the second largest importer of
cement in the world, Ghoneim states in an IDRC-funded
study on Egyptian cement, part of a seven-country
research project to identify policy interventions that can
foster competitive markets in developing countries.
Privatization sparks growth
Clearly, something had to be done. In the late 1990s, the
private sector entered the market with new plants. In a
period of 30 months, starting in 1999, the government pri-
vatized seven of the largest firms, representing more than
two-thirds of total production. It sold the control of most
of these firms to multinationals. As a Mediterranean coun-
try with a foot in both the Middle East and Africa, Egypt
offered a unique location as well as low energy and labour
costs and a growing domestic market.
The effect of privatization was almost immediate,
Ghoneim says. “Before 1999, Suez Cement and Torah
Cement were the market leaders. However, since 1999
they have lost market leadership to other producers, espe-
cially the two leading private sector companies…. who
were able to take market share away from government-
controlled firms through better management, innovative
distribution, and aggressive marketing techniques.”
With the adoption of a free market policy and privatiza-
tion, the Office of Selling Egyptian Cement was restruc-
tured and renamed the Cement Industry Committee (CIC).
One of CIC’s main responsibilities was to control the price
of cement in the domestic market. The government also
intervened directly to protect Egyptian producers, using
measures such as import controls and duties. “Some
viewed the import duties as providing unnecessary protec-
tion,” Ghoneim reports. “Others believed that such duties
protected the local industry from dumping of imported
cement.”
The increases in efficiency and productivity following pri-
vatization were so marked that there was soon an excess
supply of cement and a drop in prices but not for long.
The price of cement in Egypt has risen in recent years,
climbing from about US$24 a tonne in 2003 to around
US$73 by 2007 despite CIC’s efforts to control prices.
Producers claim the rising prices were driven by a
combination of factors, including record economic growth
in Egypt and a boom in real estate.
“Cement is a very good barometer of the overall economic
situation,” says Omar Mohanna, chairman of the country’s
largest cement manufacturer, Suez Cement.
Demand for exports
Other players in the market, such as Ali Moussa, president
of United Paints and Chemicals, suggest that the demand
for exports was the main factor contributing to soaring
prices. Moussa points to the demand for materials for
reconstruction resulting from war and natural disasters.
“There are five or six countries that will have a huge
demand for reconstruction. Moreover, demand will
increase as well in our region because of increasing oil
prices, which have encouraged governments to set pro-
grams for construction and development,” Moussa says.
Ghoneim agrees. “The construction boom in the Gulf and
the reconstruction of Iraq, accompanied by higher profit
margins from exporting rather than selling domestically
are the main reasons behind the skyrocketing prices.” He
adds that even with these higher prices, Egyptian exports
of cement are very competitive in the region.
The industry also benefits from very low energy costs
because of Egypt’s reserves of natural gas. Cement compa-
nies buy gas at the same price as it is sold to multinational
gas companies. The proximity of cement factories to the
gas fields means that the producers also save on trans-
portation costs. “As long as Egypt’s gas reserves last and
While privatization is an important step toward a free and fair















processing and transport costs remain relatively low,
Egypt’s cement industry will continue to benefit from a
sustainable competitive advantage of low energy costs,”
Ghoneim says.
By 2003 Egypt ranked fifth among the world’s cement-
exporting nations. The industry’s competitive edge was
given a boost that year by the government’s decision to
float the Egyptian currency, which had until then been
pegged at an unrealistically high level. The subsequent
drop in the value of the currency increased the demand
for Egyptian cement in established export markets in
neighbouring countries such as Algeria, Libya, Sudan, and
Tunisia. In addition, Ghoneim notes that “the Egyptian
cement industry is well positioned to become an exporter
into the Mediterranean Basin and the Red Sea.” He
believes that most cement companies have not yet realized
their full export potential, and that many are still in the
early stages of penetrating foreign markets.
High domestic prices
It was clear by this time that, while privatization is an
important step toward a free and fair cement market, it
would not by itself ensure competition between firms. As
Ghoneim concluded in his 2004 study, “The industry has
experienced all features of anticompetitive behaviours,
ranging from collusive arrangements to price wars to for-
midably high prices.”
“The government has always tried to […] regulate the
market, and each time it failed, or its success was limited,”
Ghoneim notes. “The two most important solutions for this
dilemma were absent competition and consumer protec-
tion laws and the ability of the government to impose
export taxes.” Export taxes were a “second best solution”
to reorient the interests of producers back to satisfying the
needs of the domestic market, Ghoneim says. In his view,
the better approach was to enact enforceable competition
and consumer protection laws. Enactment of a competition
law, in particular, would have provided means to address
allegations of price fixing, from many in the construction
industry.
These allegations appeared to be confirmed, at least in the
case of steel: a 2004 report published by the government’s
Central Auditing Organization indicated that the rate of
increase in steel prices far exceeded increases in production
cost. The report sparked a furious debate in the People’s
Assembly, which led to calls for export quotas and reduc-
tions in customs and anti-dumping tariffs.
Ghoneim describes what happened next. “The Minister
of Trade and Industry imposed [a tax] on cement exports.
Domestic prices were supposed to decrease. In fact, the
minister tried this several times, but it seems it was not
effective to stop the increase in prices.”
Then, in 2007, the government brought in a new policy
that was intended to claw back some of the cement and
steel producers’ extraordinary profits and increase public
finance revenue. It introduced a measure to reduce energy
subsidies to domestic heavy industry, including cement pro-
ducers. By prime ministerial decree the price of gas will be
raised to the international price equivalent over the next
three years.
Legislation at last
The People’s Assembly also demanded, and got, immediate
progress on finalizing a bill to bring in antimonopoly rules
and competition law. This legislation had been in the
works since 1995 with little sign of progress. At least
17 drafts were circulated before it was finally issued in
2005. At that point it was fast-tracked through parliament,
with members passing it into law after just six sessions of
debate.
Not surprisingly, the cement industry is involved in the
antimonopoly law’s first major test. At the request of
Rachid Mohamed Rachid, Minister of Trade and Industry,
the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA), created in 2006,
began investigating the pricing of both cement and steel.
Competition policy and law are tools that need to be in place
















The ECA found that the cement producers had indeed
colluded to control cement prices through an agreement
that limited the market share of each producing company.
The prosecutor-general investigated the activities of the
cement companies that were party to that agreement and
referred the case to a criminal court in January 2008.
Meanwhile, the ECA’s investigation of the steel industry
continues.
Ghoneim welcomes the new legislation. He believes that
the sequence of market reforms was faulty. A competition
law needs to be in place before privatization occurs in
order to ensure that healthy competition results. “This was
a case where the cart was put before the horse,” he says.
“Institutions should precede policies or at least go in
tandem if we are looking for an effective market economy
outcome.”
This case study was written by Bob Stanley, a writer in
Ottawa. It is based on a draft paper, The Egyptian Cement
Industry Case, by Ahmed Farouk Ghoniem.
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